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Classical physics was based upon the assumption that experimental 
errors were just accidental and should be ignored by the theory. 
Modern physics realizes that errors are inevitable and that it is im- 
possible to go to the limit of infinitely small errors. The uncertainty 
principle and the negentropy principle of information prove that 
the smaller the error, the greater the price that must be paid for the 
observation. There is no exact limit to the accuracy, but its high 
cost makes it unattainable. Classical physics assumed complete 
determinism. The new modern "matter of fact" point of view states 
the impossibility to prove this assumption. If experimental errors 
are very small, it takes a longer time to reach the final statistical 
distribution, but this final state of statistical equilibrium will always 
be reached. Many examples are discussed, and the "matter of fact" 
point of view is compared with similar ideas presented by the Vienna 
school, by M. Born and by the Copenhagen school. 
1. OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENTAL ERRORS 
The role of experimental errors has been known for a very long time 
and was recognized by all scientists; but it was usually considered as a 
secondary effect, a source of nuisance that could be neglected in most 
occasions and should be ignored by the theory. The assumption was that 
errors could be made "as small as you wish" by careful instrumentation 
and played no essential role. This was the point o£ view of mathema- 
ticians discussing the axioms of geometry, and most physicists accepted, 
implicitly or explicitly, this kind of idealization. Modern physics had to 
get rid of these unrealistic schemes, and it was indispensable to recognize 
the fundamental importance of errors, together with the unpleasant 
fact that they cannot be made "as small as you wish," and must be in- 
cluded in the theory. 
The first instance was found in connection with statistical thermo- 
dynamics, but it was usually toned down and led to many (in our opin- 
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ion often meaningless) discussions uch as: how is it possible to obtain 
irreversible thermodynamics from strictly reversible mechanical laws? 
We shall come back to this problem when discussing the exact meaning 
of determinism and show that it corresponds to a metaphysical creed, 
not to a physical aw. 
With Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the fundamental role of ex- 
perimental errors became a basic feature of physics. An additional 
law was recently stated by the present author (Brillouin, 1956) (1) 
and called the "negentropy principle of information." It states that an 
observation yields a certain amount of information AI, that this informa- 
tion can be quantitatively measured and compared with the entropy 
increase AS during the experimental measurement. The net result is 
(in entropy units) 
AS >= AI or AI + AN ~ 0 (1) 
with AN = -- AS neg(ative) entropy 
These conditions mean that a finite amount of energy AE must be de- 
graded and changed into heat: 
AE = TAS >= TA[ T, absolute temperature 
The definition of the quantity A[ was given in my book (1956) and can 
be summarized in a simple way: Let P0 be the number of equally pos- 
sible cases before the measurement, and P1 the number of such cases 
after the observation. We define 
AI = k log (Pc~P1) (2) 
where k is Boltzmann's constant. If the accuracy is very high, PI be- 
comes very small and the amount of information is very large. Infinite 
accuracy, with infinitely small error would mean an infinite increase in 
information; hence an infinite amount of energy AE degraded. This is 
utterly impossible, as  already explained in a previous paper (Brillouin, 
1957). 
A similar opinion was expressed by M. Born (1953, 1955) in a series 
of papers, which shall be used here as the starting point for a new dis- 
cussion. Born does not use the negentropy principle of information 
(which was published about the same time) but starts from the obvious 
remark that every method of observation has its limitations, making 
experimental errors unavoidable. This is, in a general way, what is 
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stated more precisely in our conditions (1) or in other similar relations 
which will be stated now: When extreme accuracy is required, one dis- 
covers a new restriction, which makes it even more difficult to make a 
measurement of very small distances. One finds (Brillouin, 1956, p. 235) 
that a very large amount of energy AE is needed for the observation of a 
distance x within a very small error Ax: 
AEAx >_ J/~hc (3) 
This very large energy AE is partly dissipated, according to the previous 
condition (1), and when Ax becomes extremely small (smaller than 10 -~4 
cm, for instance), the new condition (3) requires an expense in energy 
that is very much higher than what would result from, for example, (1). 
Born also discusses a very typical example, which shows the connec- 
tion between his viewpoint and the basic assumptions of statistical 
thermodynamics. This example is extremely instructive since it exhibits 
in the simplest possible way, most of the essential features which we 
want to emphasize. We shall examine this problem with more details 
in the next section. 
2. A S IMPLE EXAMPLE FOR DISCUSSION: 
LAPLACE'S DEMON EXORCISED 
Let us consider a ball moving along the x direction between two 
rigid walls located at x = ±l .  The motion seems perfectly determinate 
but we want to take account of the inevitable rrors in measuring the 
initial conditions: When we throw the ball, we know the point of de- 
parture x --- 0 only within an error Ax and we can define the initial im- 
pulse p only within Ap. This simple problem was discussed by Born. 
He emphasized the fact that after a time t has elapsed, we know the 
position of the ball with an error Ax Jr (t/m)Ap and this may soon be- 
come larger than the distance 2l between walls. Henceforth we only can 
say that the ball is somewhere between these walls, a result which can 
hardly be called "determinism." 
This very same example was discussed by E. Borel (1925) in his lec- 
tures on statistical mechanics, in order to visualize the exact meaning of 
the famous Liouville theorem. If we plot the motion in the x,p-plane 
(phase xtension) this theorem states that the area AxAp, defined by the 
initial errors, moves along the trajectory and gets distorted in an unpre- 
dictable way, but always keeps the same area. Figure 1 explains the general 
situation: The points of departure cover the initial rectangle "0," but 
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points with a larger p have  also a larger velocity V = p/m and move 
faster along x; hence, after a short time t we obtain the oblique distribu- 
tion "I," which has obviously the same area as "0." Then comes a reflec- 
tion off the first wall and a reversal of p, which leads to the shapes "II," 
" I I I " ;  a new reflection off the -1  wall would bring the Liouville area 
back into the upper region. During the motion this area gets thinner 
and thinner, and is broken into many layers, up and down, as sketched 
on Fig. 2. Our experimental techniques cannot be accurate enough to 
detect all these layers and distinguish between them, and after a while 
we can only say that the representative points lie in the two rectangles 
- l  =< x N + l  and p,p + zip or -p ,  -p  - Ap. Furthermore, the aver- 
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age density is uniform in both rectangles. This last result is a form of 
the ergodic theorem. 
It was necessary, for this general proof, to use two fundamental s- 
sumptions: (a) Initial conditions are subject to inevitable rrors Ax, 
Ap. (b) Final state is observed with errors Ax, Ap. Both assumptions are 
direct consequences of the uncertainty principle and of the general con- 
ditions (1) and (2), if we remember that the amount of energy available 
in the laboratory (and partly degraded uring the measuring experi- 
ments) is finite. This limits the entropy increase AS to a certain maxi- 
mum value and makes it impossible to assume infinitely small errors 
Ax and Ap. Conditions (1) and (2) remove any possibility of proving 
scientifically the validity of determinism. Knowing the initial conditions 
within certain errors, we can predict he future only for a limited time 
interval. After that, we do not know exactly what happens. And this is 
the justification for statistical mechanics. 
Laplace invented, more than a century ago, a demon who was sup- 
posed to know exactly the positions and velocities of all atoms in the 
universe, and to compute xactly the future evolution of the whole world 
(exact determinism). The present discussion isan exorcising of Laplace's 
demon. Both the uncertainty principle and the negentropy principle 
of information make Laplace's cheme completely unrealistic. The prob- 
lem is an artificial one; it belongs to imaginative poetry, not to experi- 
mental science. 
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3. SOME MORE EXAMPLES: ANHARMONIC OSCILLATORS, 
RECTIFIER 
The importance of this subject iustifies some more discussion. We 
start with the harmonic oscillator, where the trajectories in the x,p-plane 
are ellipses 
1 p~t_ l  2--m 2 ~x~ = Eto~ a constant (4) 
A convenient unit change can be used to reduce the ellipses to circles, 
taking 
1/m = c~. 
Oscillations are isochronous and keep the same frequency for all ampli- 
tudes. The result is to maintain constant not only the area but also the 
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shape of the Liouville surface element. This is shown on Fig. 3, where 
the surface element appears unchanged in positions 0, I, II, and II I. 
There is no spreading of the representative points in this model, which 
appear as an interesting exception. A similar case will be found for an 
idealized rectifier shown in Fig. 6. 
As soon as the harmonicity is perturbed we see the area spreading 
again. The case of Fig. 4 corresponds to increased stiffness for large oscil- 
lations. The trajectory is an ellipse (a circle on Fig. 4) centered on 0 
for the central part, joining right and left ellipses of centers B and A. 
On these junctions, the Liouville area takes a position which is oblique 
with respect o a radius drawn from B (or A) and this obliquity increases 
at each revolution. The general situation is similar to that of Fig. 1, 
and it actually reduces to Fig. 1 if we take ~ = 0 and fl infinite. 
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Another possibility is shown on Fig. 5 with a restoring force reaching 
the saturation values ±4 when lx [ > 1. The external trajectories are 
parabolic urves 
2 
2-~ p =t=¢x = E (5) 
and these trajectories exhibit a slow motion. The external points lag 
behind the inner points. The Liouville area is distorted in the opposite 
way to that of Fig. 4. 
Fig. 6 corresponds to a sort of rectifier, with a weak restoring force 
-ax  on the left and a very strong restoring force - f ix  on the right. 
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The trajectories are ellipses centered on 0 on both sides and oscillations 
remain synchronal for all amplitudes. The average center of mass moves 
progressively to the left when the oscillations become larger and larger, 
and this represents the rectifying effect. There is no spreading of the 
Liouville area. Another curious example is represented on Fig. 7 and 
corresponds to  the limit of Fig. 5 when the distance l is zero. The tra- 
jectories are parabolic on both sides and the outer part of the Liouville 
area is strongly lagging behind. 
4. THE ANOMALY OF THE HARMONIC  OSCILLATOR 
Looking back at the different examples just discussed, we observe a 
general situation similar to that obtained in Section 2. The Liouville 
area maintains a constant value, but it is soon elongated in such a way 
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that it spreads over the whole region of possible motions. There is one 
exception, represented by the strictly harmonic motion (Fig. 3) or by 
the more artificial rectifier of Fig. 6. For these two examples the Liouville 
area maintains a constant shape and is not distorted in course of time. 
Is this anomaly real or does it correspond to an artificial situation? 
The answer is obvious. It is absolutely unrealistic to speak of an har- 
monic oscillator with a strictly defined frequency. We never observe 
such an example. Every oscillator exhibits a large or small frequency 
band. It  may be due to irregular fluctuations in the restoring force, or 
to some damping, but there is no spectral ine of absolute purity. In 
spectroscopy, just a few spectral lines have been found pure enough to 
be used as frequency standards, and even these selected lines have al- 
ways a finite and measurable width. Experimentally, we do not know 
any single line of zero width. 
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Theoretically, all the oscillators we can think of are physical structures 
subject o fluctuations and whose boundary conditions are not absolutely 
constant. We consider it unrealistic to speak of exact initial conditions. 
I t  is just as unrealistic to assume an exact frequency of oscillations. The 
frequency v is defined with an error Av. Let us wait a long time t and 
look for the phase ~ of the oscillations 
t = n+ ¢ T =-  n + ninteger;  rper iod  
or  
= 2~r(vt - -  n )  
Assuming t large, and v defined within an error Av the phase ~ exhibits 
an error 
A~o = 21r tAv  (6) 
which may become as large as we wish. The situation is illustrated in 
Fig. 8. The Liouville theorem applies only if the restoring force is con- 
stant in time, and this is no more the case. There is no conservation of 
area for the Liouville surface element, which extends progressively until 
it covers entirely the whole region of possible motions. The uncertainty 
on the frequency restores here a situation similar to that obtained on 
other examples. I t  is well known that fluctuations in the restoring force 
(hence in the frequency) result from a variety of physical causes. For 
FIG. 8 
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spectral ines, the role of the motion of atoms (DSppler effect) and of 
collisions with other atoms (finite wave trains) have been extensively 
studied and do actually broaden the lines. 
To summarize the problem, it is sufficient o note that an ideal os- 
cillator (with kv = 0) would be a perfect clock and allow for a measure- 
ment of time with infinite accuracy; and infinite accuracy is a physical 
impossibility. 
5. THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINISM 
The laws of classical mechanics represent a mathematical idealization 
and should not be assumed to correspond to the real laws of nature. In 
many problems (astronomy, for instance) they yield wonderful results 
that check with observation within experimental errors. In other fields 
they had to be amended (relativity, quantum mechanics). The classical 
viewpoint was to ignore the actual role and importance of experimental 
errors. Errors were assumed to be accidental; hence, it was always imag- 
ined that they could be made as small as one wished and finally ignored. 
This oversimplified picture led to the assumption of complete deter- 
minism in classical mechanics. We now have to realize that experimental 
errors are inevitable (see Section 1), a discovery that makes strict de- 
terminism impossible. Errors are an essential part of the world's picture 
and must be included in the theory. 
Causality must be replaced by statistical probabilities; a scientist may 
or may not believe in determinism. It is a matter of faith, and belongs 
to metaphysics. Physical discussions are unable to prove or to disprove 
it. This general viewpoint may be called the "matter of fact" position. 
M. Born states very clearly the situation. He quotes Einstein 
(1953) as saying that before quantum mechanics, it was assumed that 
"everything was to be reduced to objects situated in space-time, and to 
strict relations between these ob jects . . .  Nothing appeared to refer to 
our empirical knowledge about these ob jects . . .  This is what was meant 
by a physical description of a real external world." This position appears 
as untenable in modern physics. We have no way to prove the existence 
of such a real external world, and it is very dangerous to speak of some- 
thing we cannot observe. If we restrain our thinking to observable facts, 
we can only speak of possible relations between a certain experiment 
and another one, but we should never discuss what happens while we 
are not making any observation; we must candidly admit that we do 
not know (no more than we know what happens on the other side of 
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the moon). The position defined in this way is taken by M. Born and 
agrees with the philosophy of science stated by the Vienna school. It is 
close to positivism but carefully avoids many misrepresentations f old, 
fashioned positivism. 
Is such a viewpoint accepted by all physicists? The answer is far 
from clear. Pure mathematicians have a great difficulty to agree with 
this inclusion of errors within the theory, and many theoretical physicists 
are still mathematicians at heart. The uncertainty relations of Bohr 
and Heisenberg are based upon the kind of thinking we tried to define. 
But when one looks at the further expansion of quantum theories, he is 
amazed at the many fancy visualizations describing physics in terms of 
unobservable entities. The language of physicists i loaded with a jargon 
understandable only to specialists; special names have been coined for 
terms in a series of approximations, as if each isolated term had a mean- 
ing (exchange terms, pair creation, virtual creation and absorption of 
particles, etc.). Actually, only the final sum matters. Wise men know 
where and how to use these figures of language, and they are aware of 
their complete lack of reality. They realize that the jargon represents no 
more than an artificial way of describing complicated equations; but 
many physicists may be misled by such methods, which are really dan- 
gerous. In brief, quantum theory pays lip service to the sound principle 
of matter-of-fact descriptions, but soon forgets about it and uses a very 
careless language. 
Besides mathematicians and quantum theoreticians, we find many 
scientists feeling very reluctant o face the situation described above 
and to abandon old-fashioned i eas. They still believe in a real physical 
world following its own unperturbed evolution, whether we observe it 
or not. In order to reconcile this view with recent physical discoveries, 
they have to invent the existence of a number of "hidden variables" 
that we are unable to observe at present. In my opinion these hidden 
variables may do more harm than good. If we cannot observe them, let 
us admit that they have no reality and may exist only in the imagina- 
tion of their authors. This is not meant o be a sarcasm. Imagination is
absolutely needed in scientific research, and many important discoveries 
were, at the beginning, pure works of imagination; they became impor- 
tant only later when experimental proof was obtained and checked with 
results predicted by pure imagination. Finally, the new experimental 
discoveries became the scientific basis for the part that had been verified 
by experiment. 
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Quantum mechanics gave a wonderful description of the atomic and 
molecular structures, but did not succeed very well for field theory. As 
for newly discovered particles, they still remain very mysterious and it 
would be hard to predict he type of theory that may help understanding 
them. For distances below 10 -28 era, many new laws will have to be dis- 
covered. They are taking shape only bit by bit. 
6. INFORMATION THEORY AND OUR PRECEDING EXAMPLES 
All the examples discussed in Sections 2-4, are interesting to re-ex- 
amine from the point of view of information theory. The position of the 
representative point in the x,p-plane is initially known within an area 
A0 = Ax0AP0 (7) 
If we do not change the accuracy of our measuring instruments, we must 
admit that the area does not practically remain constant (as was stated 
by Liouville) but actually increases progressively. This was shown in 
Figs. 1-5, 7, and 8. After a long period of time, the uncertainty region 
practically covers the whole surface between inner and outer energy 
boundaries, as shown in Fig. 2. Hence, the area A increases until it 
reaches a final limit A~ given by the whole area of possible motions of 
energy E (within hE). 
The information we have about the system is defined by the formula 
(2). The P1 number is proportional to A and increases from A0 to A~. 
The initial Po number depends upon experimental conditions. Let us 
assume a piece of apparatus where the position can vary from -L  to 
+L  while the momentum could take any value from -P~ to A-P~. 
Such conditions would yield 
Po = 4LP,~ (8) 
This is similar to problems discussed in Chapter 20 of my book (1956). 
The information according to (2), for example, is 
AI = /c(log P0 -- log P1) = --k log A -t- C e (9) 
a formula where k log P0 plays the role of an additional constant C t, 
very similar to the additional constant in many entropy formulas. 
In course of time, A increases from A0 to A~ and the information de- 
creases accordingly. The natural evolution of the system corresponds to
a progressive loss of information. Our general discussion leads directly 
to the law of loss of information (increase of entropy), which provoked 
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so many discussions ince the time of Boltzmann. We had to renounce 
many classical assumptions; we showed the unphysical nature of deter- 
minism and maintained the "matter-of-fact" viewpoint. We thus ob- 
tained the fundamental law of entropy increase. 
We can look at this problem from another angle and plot the motion 
of the center of gravity G of the area containing the representative point. 
This is shown in Fig. 9, which corresponds roughly to the problem of 
Fig. 8. The successive positions Go, GI, G2 " .  , describe a spiral which 
goes through the origin 0 when the shaded area covers exactly (for the 
first time) the whole area between the inner and outer energy circles. 
When the shaded areas overlap, the point G moves away from 0 and 
comes back to 0 again when the shaded area covers twice the circular 
ring, and so on. 
If our moving particles are electrically charged, the oscillations of the 
center of gravity G will be visible by an emission of electromagnetic 
radiation and the wave train will exhibit an exponential damping with 
beats at t~, & and as shown on Fig. 10. When the time elapsed becomes 
A 
0 ta t 
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very large, oscillations get so small that they can no more be observed 
and the information has decreased to its lowest value. 
AI~ = C t - k log A~ (10) 
This discussion helps visualizing the mechanism of natural oss of in- 
formation. 
The well-known arguments against Boltzmann stated by Losehmidt 
(reversibility) or Zermelo-Poinear~ (recurrence) can be discarded as cor- 
responding to unphysical assumptions, impossible to realize in practice. 
Let us, for instance, consider the question of time reversibility. Particles 
are emitted (errors Ax and Ap) at time 0, as in Fig. 1. At a certain time 
h all velocities are suddenly reversed (how to do it is another question !); 
the particles travel backwards and regroup together at time 2h, re- 
building the original signal. If this could actually be done, irreversibility 
would be disproved. But, we have emphasized the impossibility to ignore 
experimental errors, and there are many points where they come in: 
(a) The reversal time tl is defined within an error At1 ; hence, the sig- 
nal is rebult at 2h with an error 2Ah. 
(b) The reversal is not rigorously obtained. Original particles were 
moving in the x direction, for instance, and reflected particles will have 
small transverse velocities vyv,. They will come back to the origin within 
a distance 2tlVy and 2tlv~, these errors increasing with h • 
(e) The field of forces through which particles are moving cannot be 
kept rigorously independent of time. It  will exhibit fluctuations (as in 
the problem of Section 4, Fig. 7). These fluctuations make the Liouville 
theorem invalid and also destroy the reversibility. 
Altogether, the idea of reversibility in mechanical motions is just a 
dream and cannot be checked exactly on account of experimental errors, 
which become larger and larger when the reversal time h increases pro- 
gressively. 
The only known example of reversal was discovered by E. L. Hahn 
(1950) with spin echoes and exhibits the characteristics specified here. 
Echoes get smaller and less sharp when reversal time is increased. Exact 
reversal and exact reversibility are out of question. 
7. OBSERVATION AND INTERPRETATION 
The point of view presented in this paper can be compared with the 
discussion at a recent meeting held in Bristol (KSrner, 1957) where 
philosophers and physicists compared opinions on "Observation and 
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Interpretation." Theory belongs to the interpretation of experiments, 
and the whole problem is: how much is added to experimental f cts (and 
hence liable to misunderstandings), and how can we distinguish these 
creations of our imagination from actual observations? Can we even 
eliminate the imaginative lements and maintain strictly the "matter- 
of-fact" point of view advocated in the preceding sections? 
We recognized in Section 5, that theory is a work of imagination, first 
built on a few arbitrary guesses, later compared with observation. If
experimental facts check with theoretical predictions, the usefulness of 
the theory is proven but this does not mean that all the original guesses 
(or postulates) are right. Many historical discussions exemplify the 
contrary: the elastic theory of light assumed an "ether" with very 
strange properties. It was replaced by the electromagnetic heory of 
Maxwell (still with another strange ther) and finally the ether was dis- 
carded as nonsense by Einstein. Now we have the quantized field theory, 
which certainly contains many nonobservable f atures, and can hardly 
be considered as a finished piece of theory. In these successive trans- 
formations, the imaginative elements were completely different, but the 
amount of experimental territory covered was progressively extended. 
Theory is like a map of reality, it is not a correct and complete de- 
scription of the world. We start with a plane map, then we modify it 
to include the rotundity of the earth, and step by step we improve our 
representation, but this is a job never ended and never finished. 
At each stage of a theory some scientists pretend to prove that the 
theory is perfect, and that it is not possible to modify it in any way. 
The only thing they can prove is that the theory is consistent, logically 
built, and checks with experimental evidence over a certain limited 
ground. But very soon, new empirical facts will be discovered which re- 
quire a complete reshaping of theories. Quantum theories were suppos- 
edly proven to be the final word 1 and now they are unable to explain all 
the strange new particles recently discovered, not to speak of the prob- 
lems of nuclear structures. 
At the Bristol symposium, L. Rosenfeld iscussed (KSrner, 1957, p. 
41) the foundations of quantum theory and presented the Copenhagen 
point of view, which is very close to the general positions taken by M. 
Born and the present writer. In the opposite camp, D. Bohm attempted 
to justify theories playing with unobservable variables, and discussions 
1 Many discussions of a famous theorem of yon Neumann may be found in 
K6rner (1957, pp. 33, 47, 140) and represent a striking example of our remarks. 
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between both groups were very lively. Everybody agreed that many 
strange things appear for distances smaller than 10 -13 cm, but their theo- 
retical explanation is still to be discovered. The Rosenfeld report should 
be especially commended asparticularly clear and aiming at an economy 
in undefined postulates. Two reports of the Bristol meeting (Feyeraband 
and Siissmann) deal with the theory of measurement and seem to be 
more interested in logical formalism than in actual experiments. It is 
curious to note that experimental errors are practically ignored in these 
reports; the first one is essentially based on yon Neumann's formal analy- 
sis, whereas the second one emphasizes the role of SchrSdinger waves and 
discusses the "quantum jumps" provoked by coupling the observed 
system to the measuring device. Many of the remarks made in the dis- 
cussion of these reports eem rather artificial because they omit experi- 
mental errors, background noise in the observations, noise in the ampli- 
fiers, etc. Experts in information theory know the importance of these 
factors, which have been almost completely overlooked in the Bristol 
symposium. 2 
Many other points of importance should be raised about the Bristol 
meeting, in connection with "scientific prediction" and quantum theory 
description, but it seems uch a discussion would take us too far away 
from our main objective. Let us strongly suggest to the reader to study 
these most interesting reports. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
A short conclusion may be useful and give a summary of the present 
paper. 
I. Experimental errors are inevitable, and it is unscientific to think of 
infinite accuracy in any measurement. This limitation is already present 
in classical theories (M. Born) and is formulated in precise ways by 
quantum conditions and information theory (Section 1). 
II. Some simple examples are discussed in Sections 2-4, and show the 
type of uncertainties ncountered ven in classical models. 
III. The inevitable rrors must be included in the theory, since they 
are an essential part of our knowledge of the world around us. This 
makes strict determinism impossible in scientific prediction. Laplace's 
demon cannot make accurate measurements and is unable to predict 
exactly the future. (Sections 2and 5). This is what we called the "matter 
of fact" point of view. 
2 See a remark by Landsberg (K6rner, 1957, p. 145). 
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IV. The natural  evolution of a system corresponds to a loss of informa- 
tion, hence an increase of entropy (Section 6). Similar problems were 
discussed at the Bristol symposium. 
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